The Middle East: Petroleum Supply Security or Political Stability? by Naji Abi-Aad; Strategic Insights, v. 7, issue 1 (February 2008) by Abi-Aad, Naji
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2008-02-01
The Middle East: Petroleum Supply
Security or Political Stability? by Naji
Abi-Aad; Strategic Insights, v. 7, issue 1
(February 2008)
Abi-Aad, Naji
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
Strategic Insights, V. 7 issue 1 (February 2008)
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/11081
 The Middle East: Petroleum Supply Security or Political Stability? 
Strategic Insights, Volume VII, Issue 1 (February 2008) 
by Naji Abi-Aad, Ph.D.  
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction  
While many situations of instability and conflict in the Middle East remain restricted on a limited 
scale, any internal or regional crisis affecting the security of petroleum supplies from the area to 
world markets is immediately considered as a threat to international peace. The world, and 
especially the West, is in fact more concerned about a strife in the region if it is associated with 
either a threat to or an actual disruption of petroleum supplies. This behaviour derives from an 
implicit conviction that Middle Eastern petroleum is to be "shared" among its producers and 
consumers, being vitally and strategically important to the latter’s economies. 
In fact, the present geopolitical and strategic importance of the Middle East is mainly the result of 
its petroleum resources. As holder of the world’s most abundant proven reserves of crude oil 
(about 62 percent of the total in 2006), or around 743 billion barrels, as well as the world’s highest 
reserve-to-production ratio (eighty years compared to forty years worldwide), the paramount 
importance of the region within the international system is self-evident. Middle Eastern oil 
production amounted to some 31 per cent of the world’s total in 2006 when around half of the 
global oil trade originated from the region, which is expected to retain the role of major source of 
incremental supplies that it has had since the 1940s. 
The Middle East also includes large actual and potential natural gas producers that would 
significantly alter the international supply picture, if supplies were interrupted . A helping factor is 
the quite huge gas resource base in the area in relation to its current and expected level of 
demand. At the beginning of 2007, natural gas reserves in the region accounted for about 41 
percent of the world’s total, or around 73,500 billion cubic meters that alone are sufficient to 
satisfy current worldwide consumption for more than twenty-five years. However, considering the 
enormous potential of the Middle East, little has been done so far to exploit its natural gas 
reserves. The 2006 gas reserves-to-production ratio was relatively very high, covering more than 
200 years compared to only sixty-three years worldwide. 
But while petroleum confers on the Middle East its geopolitical and strategic weight, it is also the 
region’s Achilles’ heel: any dispute or conflict there could be tempted to materialize first by 
striking at the petroleum industry that remains the backbone of many states in the area. Some of 
the recent crises in the region were associated with either a threat to or an actual disruption of oil 
supplies. Oil was even used as a political weapon by Arabs in the aftermath of the 1967 and 1973 
conflicts with Israel. 
Add to all that the fact that there are only few industries more vulnerable both on land and at sea 
than the petroleum industry, and the world has got a major interest in an issue of prime 
importance: the security of petroleum supplies from the Middle East. 
While the petroleum production installations in the Middle East have been highly exposed to 
internal attack and instability, the six maritime channels in the region—the Suez Canal, the straits 
of Hormuz, Bab Al Mandeb and Tiran, and the two Turkish straits, and their concentration of 
petroleum shipping, have always been faced with the danger of closure or blockade. When not 
faced by that danger, petroleum tankers have been vulnerable to attack from air, land and sea 
(including floating mines) and therefore their safety cannot be fully guaranteed. The shipping 
routes in the region are indeed vulnerable along their entire length. 
Oil pipelines built in the Middle East have generally focused on the security of supply and export 
rather than the economic objective of cheaper oil transport. Nevertheless, that security objective 
has not been met through pipelines. An assessment of the historical record of the petroleum 
pipelines in the region until the end of 2006 reveals that during the 360 years representing the 
cumulative age of the international export pipelines (crossing at least one state boundary), some 
165 years of actual pumping, or only 46 per cent, have been recorded (reference to be added). It 
is also interesting to note that every international export pipeline in the region was shut down at 
least once. As far as the internal export pipelines are concerned, the ratio of actual pumping has 
reached 83 per cent. Thus, the overall ratio of actual pumping amounts to some 61 per cent (then 
an interruption ratio of 39 per cent!) representing 367 years over a cumulative total age of 602 
years, or 235 years of interrupted pumping. 
Few believe the security of petroleum supplies from the Middle East has tended to have a 
circumscribed meaning unrelated to its political context. The argument is based on the fact that 
the three wars involving Iraq (in the 1980s, early 1990’s and 2003) show that oil production and 
export installations are far less vulnerable than is often assumed, and that the experience of 
those conflicts suggests that overland oil transportation through pipelines is more resilient to 
attack than maritime outlets and sea transportation. Then, because of the diversification of the oil 
transportation system, and with a few additional pipelines, a stage may be reached where oil 
exports from the region would be considered as ‘very safe’. 
In fact, only few pipelines in the Middle East appear to have been shut down as a result of military 
hostilities. Pipelines in the region running above ground, as well as pumping stations, were only 
hit intermittently by a direct terrorist attack or air strikes. Both Saudi and Iraqi lines to the 
Mediterranean have been temporarily cut by terrorist actions and air attacks, while only some 
sections and pumping stations of the Iraqi export system were damaged as a result of the 
conflicts involving that country since the early 1980s. 
However, this argument seems not to take into consideration the main reasons behind the 
closure of many export pipelines in the Middle East, i.e., the political conflicts within producing 
countries or transit states, and the interstate disputes. In fact, most of the pipelines crossing state 
boundaries have fallen victim to the region’s political rivalries and conflicts. The pipelines built to 
carry oil from Iraq to the Mediterranean coasts help to demonstrate the point. The line built before 
the Second World War to Haifa (then in Palestine) was permanently closed in 1948 as a result of 
the first Arab–Israeli conflict, while lines to Lebanon’s Tripoli and Syria’s Banias repeatedly fell 
victim to Iraqi–Syrian antagonism. In the political aftermath of the 1990-91 conflict over Kuwait, 
the oil pipeline terminating at the Saudi Western coast has been shut down since August 1990, 
whereas those built through Turkey to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean had been closed until 1996. 
It is true that decades of pipeline and export terminal construction have diversified Middle Eastern 
oil and gas export routes and significantly reduced their vulnerability, a trend that will be 
reinforced by the execution of some of the planned pipelines and terminals. But the threats of 
political disruption in producing or in transit countries, as well as interstate conflicts and/or 
subsequent military hostilities, further fuelled by many elements of instability in the region, are 
strongly present. This situation occurs at a time when terrorist attacks are growing in number and 
shape, and long-range missiles are being developed and acquired by countries in the area, 
shaking the military balance and leading to a rethinking of security in global terms. 
Considering that producing countries in the Middle East are largely living off their hydrocarbon 
resources and consequently having to sell them, and that transit fees constitute an important 
share of the transit countries’ revenues, one can argue that the risk of permanent or sustained 
interruption of petroleum supplies from the region is slight, as a result of "the mutual dependency 
stabilizing factor." However, the possibility of short-term (weeks, months, or even years) 
interruption of petroleum supplies because of governments in the region losing control over one 
or more of the endogenous pressures along the area is considered to be high. Arab oil 
embargoes applied in the aftermath of the 1967 and 1973 conflicts with Israel, and the 
international sanctions against Iraq between 1990 and 2003 have further demonstrated the point. 
All this leads us to reply to the question suggested by the title of the present paper by confirming 
that there is indeed no security for petroleum supply from the Middle East without real political 
stability in the region. Nevertheless, the turbulent history of the area does not augur well for 
stability: if it is not one country it is another, and if it is not one issue it is another. That induces us 
to conclude that one of the greatest threats to petroleum market stability in the years ahead 
remains the potential for conflicts and disputes in the Middle East. 
Regrettably, there are still those who believe that—since the United States appears prepared to 
act as the policeman in the Middle East—future conflicts in the region can effectively be localized 
and threats to stability quickly eliminated. But such a complacent approach towards potential 
regional instability implies a serious misunderstanding of the conflict dynamics of in the area, 
which could ultimately result in reverse impacts. 
Likewise, there are still those who believe that a final peace (if there is one!) between Arabs and 
Israel will bring an end to all problems in the Middle East. Maybe this is due to the fact that the 
Arab–Israeli conflict has dominated much of the general discussion about the region’s 
developments over the past sixty years. However, such a peace, which will surely shift the 
perception of political risk of the area, will be unable to eliminate all of the factors of conflict and 
instability militating in favour of the region’s continuous political volatility. Unfortunately, 
insufficient attention has been devoted to those factors that may not be quite as eye-catching or 
newsworthy or even maybe about which there is lack of information. 
Some of those potential sources of instability and conflict in the Middle East are imminent, while 
others are inherent and historic, incipient, latent and potential, and internal or interstate. They are 
broadly comparable, and include the autocratic nature of the regimes and the struggle for power, 
interstate ideological cleavages, military antagonisms and race, ambition and structure of armed 
forces, sectarian minorities and religious rivalry, ethnic heterogeneity and minorities, border 
disputes, disparity in economic development, social impacts of economic constraints, divergence 
in petroleum policies, struggles over water, demographic explosion, disparity in population growth, 
and troubles caused by foreign labour migration, internal flight and flows of refugees. Those 
factors are generally interrelated and interdependent. 
Many hope to see the Middle East experiencing the same peaceful atmosphere prevailing in 
Western Europe since the end of the Second World War after long centuries of wars, conflicts, 
and disputes, and despite relatively better prospects for peace between Arabs and Israel. 
However, many of those underlying causes of the region’s instability and conflict appear to be 
strengthening. This reflects a new political environment in which main threats have been replaced 
by less-than-vital concerns. The reduction of major threats, like the Israeli one, has diminished 
the need for regional cohesion and national unity, and has led to states and communities feeling 
able to pursue past claims. But the consequent surfacing of many underlying causes of instability 
and conflict in the region is also symptomatic of far deeper political differences in an area that is 
not monolithic, and where many divisive elements exist—witness the tribal and dynastic 
differences which are at times accentuated by resource considerations and historical or cultural 
animosities. 
Rather than identifiable threats to peace, those factors of conflict and instability are grounds for 
uncertainty about the future. They may remain dormant or deferred, yet always bearing the 
potential to re-emerge as catalysts of conflicts under the appropriate conditions. Instability and 
unrest could erupt any time and anywhere in the region, regardless of what has happened in the 
past, leading to "a chain of conflict reaction." Such a chain reaction, launched and fuelled by 
many subjective and concrete elements, is unpredictable by nature. A chain reaction in the area 
due to interstate conflict or internal instability might indeed be triggered off by a change in one 
country, broadening the scope of friction and implicating other states within the region. How and 
to which extent, such a chain reaction will be triggered off remains an open question. 
The threats are real, and their unpredictable and varied nature renders the problems of 
countering them even more difficult. They need to be dealt with in a comprehensive manner but, 
truth to tell, there are no easy solutions. 
Seen from another angle, it would be quite illusory to continue talking of the ‘stability’ of the 
Middle East, while disregarding the legitimate national aspirations and economic development 
imperatives of its countries. Thus, long-term market prices reflecting the real economic value of 
these countries’ resources, lower budget deficits, more investment, greater shared prosperity, 
relevant budgets and development plans and less military spending, but also more democracy 
and regional co-operation, and less (or at least fair and respectful) foreign intervention, all form a 
"virtuous circle." 
Only if the Middle East manages to enter this virtuous circle and let energy and peace work for 
each other, will the region emerge into a new era. At that time, the area will be able to unleash its 
huge economic potential and only then will the world be able to rely on the region’s greatest asset 
after its people, its petroleum and gas. 
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